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July 25, 2003 
 
Default episodes in the 1990s:  What have we learned? 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  External financing can help a country to grow faster by financing productive 
investment and by minimizing the impact of shocks on economic activity.  Excessive 
debt flows, however, can be a problem for emerging market countries.  As debt burden 
rises, a country becomes more vulnerable to stoppages or reversals of such flows and to 
debt crisis.  Historical evidence from the nineteenth and twentieth century suggests that 
cross-border lending to sovereigns has generally been characterized by cycles of boom 
and bust, and associated debt crises.  Lindert and Morton (1989) find that historically 
foreign lending has been characterized by recurrent debt crises: in the 1820s, 1870s, 
1890s, 1930s and 1980s.  These debt crises episodes usually followed a wave of 
international lending, like the British lending spurt of the 1850s and 1860s to finance 
railroads in Latin America, the wave of European financing to Argentina in the 1880s, the 
U.S. led bond financing boom of the late 1920s, and the bank lending spurt of the 1970s 
that recycled petro-dollars from the first oil price shock of 1973 to developing countries.  




Not surprisingly then, recent day debtor countries are encountering debt problems, 
just like their historical counterparts.  What is surprising though, is that the frequency 
and, perhaps, intensity of these crises seems to have risen.  Since the early 1980s, groups 
of emerging market economies have experienced many episodes of international capital 
market closure, as investors have been unwilling to roll over amounts coming due or to 
provide additional financing.  Standard and Poor’s survey of default episodes finds 84 
events of sovereign default on private-source debt between 1975 and 2002 (Annex 1).  
While S&P’s definition of default is somewhat broad, ranging from missed interest and 
or principal payments as well as outright repudiation, it points to the relatively large 
incidence of payment difficulties in recent periods.
2  This contrasts with the experience of 
the nineteenth century, where debt difficulties were confined to relatively few countries.  
Indeed, Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) estimate that for a randomly selected country the 
probability of experiencing a crisis in a post-1973 year is twice as high as in a pre-1914 
year.  The largest incidence of defaults occurred in the 1930s, following the lending 
boom of the 1920s.
3  
 
  Debt crises can have potentially substantial costs to the economy in terms of large 
output losses, higher unemployment, and slippage on poverty alleviation.  Hutchinson 
                                                 
1 Also see Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996). 
2 The increase in frequency of defaults beginning in the 1980s may have to do with the fact that 
there was a new wave of lending in 1974-81, whereas there was a near hiatus in foreign lending 
to developing countries in the period  1930 to 1973. 
3 See Bordo and Eichhengreen (1999), Eichengreen (1989) and Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996).   3
and Neuberger (2001) place the cumulative loss of output from the currency and balance 
of payment crises over 1975-97 at an estimated 5-8 percent.Sturzenegger (2002a) obtains 
similar results when looking at the output costs of defaults in the 1980s.  He estimates the 
average cumulative drop in output to be 4 percent over the 4 years immediately following 
a default.  Barro (2001) finds that for a currency cum banking crisis output growth is 
lower by 2 percent a year over 5 years.
5  These costs arise because of several factors.  
Important amongst these is the macroeconomic adjustment in response to the lower 
availability of financial resources, and therefore larger net transfers to creditors.  Also 
important, is the potential for default to severely disrupt the domestic financial system.  
Prior to default there may be an effect on the financial sector, as agents become aware of 
the risks of maintaining their deposits in a system highly exposed to government bonds, 
this leading in general to bank runs at the time of the default decision. Post default, long 
drawn out debt negotiations between debtors and creditors also hinder the recovery of the  
financial sector, especially where financial systems are weak, impairing overall 
confidence in the financial system and the government.  The potential for default to 
adversely affect other international arrangements like trade relations, are another source 
of economic costs. 
 
  Given the fact that debt payment problems are far from uncommon in emerging 
market economies, and the associated high costs of debt crises, an orderly and quick 
resolution of crises is desirable.  Thus the debt resolution frameworks of the 1980s and 
early 1990s have involved official intervention either by multilateral agencies like the 
IMF or creditor countries.  This type of “three-party” approach contrasts sharply with the 
earlier approaches to debt resolution, where there was little or no creditor government 
intervention.
6  Even during the 1980s and 1990s, the  approaches to (frameworks for) 
dealing with debt crises have changed quite radically.  The approach to dealing with debt 
crisis in the 1980s was a formal framework that essentially involved a re-profiling of debt 
service to provide cash-flow relief to the debtor and availability of new money from 
creditor banks.  This approach was designed to address a liquidity problem as opposed to 
resolving a sustainability issue.  The recognition that persistently high or rising debt 
burdens in the 1980s were indicative of insolvency problems rather than illiquidity, called 
for a paradigm shift in the response to crises and in crisis resolution.  By 1990, market-
based approaches to resolving debt crisis had gained favor.  Thus, the Brady Plan 
provided a formal mechanism for restructuring loans.  The Brady Plan recognized the 
loss of value of nonperforming debt, as well as the issue of sustainability of debt and the 
need to provide an exit strategy for countries from a debt trap.  The Brady Plan was 
generally viewed as a success as restructuring countries were able to return to capital 
markets.   
 
In a shift from the early 1990s, the latter part of the 1990s witnessed several bond 
workouts.  Unlike loan restructurings, no formal mechanisms for sovereign bond 
workouts were established.  Instead, markets have addressed the issues of bond workouts 
                                                 
 
5 The reduction in economic growth was more severe for the crisis countries of East Asia crisis 
during 1997-98.  
6 See Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996).   4
on a case-by-case basis and essentially without intervention by creditor countries or 
multilateral institutions.  Two approaches to sovereign bond workouts have been 
followed: voluntary and concerted (involuntary).  Voluntary exchanges typically re-
profile debt service, but do not lower the nominal value of debt.  A concerted approach, 
by contrast, will likely involve a haircut for investors and a subsequent debt reduction for 
the debtor.  The current framework can best be described as one of muddling through. 
 
  While the beginning of the 1990s saw a radical change in the approach to dealing 
with debt crises, the more recent debt crises have not evoked a similar response.  In 
moving forward on approaches to debt restructuring, there appears to be broad support 
for incremental change-type solutions as opposed to solutions that radically overhaul the 
international financial architecture.  Thus, voluntary, market-friendly approaches to debt 
restructuring - such as the inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign 
bond contracts – are increasingly being viewed as a step forward in improving the current 
debt restructuring process.  This, despite the concern that CACs would likely impose 
higher borrowing costs and lower overall financial flows to emerging markets.  
Collective action clauses have begun appearing in several recent sovereign bond issues.  
For example, this February, Mexico became the first major emerging market borrower to 
issue a bond with CACs under New York law.  The CAC would allow a majority of 75% 
of bondholders to make wide-ranging changes to the terms of the bond contract in the 
event of a restructuring.    By contrast, the IMF’s sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
(SDRM), which embodies an international bankruptcy procedure to facilitate debt 
workouts and calls for changing IMF Articles to override some aspects of domestic law, 
is viewed as a less viable option at this time. 
 
  The principal focus of this chapter is on sovereign defaults on external debt in the 
1990s and the lessons that have been learned.  The rest of the chapter is organized as 
follows.  Section II explains the meaning of debt default, why countries default on their 
debt obligations, and the benefits of restructuring debt.  Section III examines the 
approaches to resolving sovereign debt crises in the 1990s, and compares these 
approaches with the debt restructuring framework of the 1980s.  Section V offers some 
lessons for the future. 
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Section II:  The theory of debt default and debt restructuring 
 
What is debt default and why do countries default? 
 
  Debt default.  Debt default occurs when a borrower does not meet a debt payment 
obligation, i.e. fails to meet the terms of a contractual agreement.  Thus, nonpayment of 
principal or principal and interest as well as outright debt repudiation qualify as a default.  
This definition is useful for comparisons of default episodes across different time periods.  
In an economic sense then, a default typically is when the present value (market value) of 
debt is below the face value or original value of the debt.  
 
  Although the focus of the paper is essentially on sovereign defaults on external 
debt to private creditors, public and private sector defaults that bring off-balance sheet 
liabilities onto the government’s balance sheet are also included.  Sovereign defaults on 
external official debt – i.e. bilateral and multilateral – are not addressed here.  
 
  Why do countries default?  Sovereigns default because they can’t meet their 
contractual obligations or because they don’t want to meet their contractual obligations.  
Amongst those debtors that can’t pay their obligations are (1) those that can’t pay now 
and (2) those that can’t pay over any reasonable time period.  Understanding sovereign 
debt defaults is complex, and issues of liquidity, solvency, and unwillingness to pay need 
to be addressed when evaluating the incentive for sovereigns to default. 
 
Liquidity problem.  An economy faces a liquidity problem when its debt liabilities 
coming due in a given period exceed its liquid foreign currency assets, including 
funds that it has borrowed from overseas.  That is, an economy faces a cash flow 
problem, although it might be solvent in the long run.  Liquidity problems generally 
emerge when there is a sudden change in investor sentiment that results in a sharp 
stop or reversal of capital flows by nonresidents or in capital flight by residents.   
Consequently, the economy is unable to meet its immediate external obligations. 
 
 Sustainability problem.  A solvency problem, by contrast, is when the economy may 
never be able to service its debt out of its own resources.  Thus, the maximum 
discounted sum of current and future trade balances is less than its current 
outstanding debt.  A solvency problem implies that the balance of payments is 
unsustainable over the medium- to long-term horizon.  While a solvency problem 
implies a liquidity problem, it is possible for a liquidity problem to arise 
independently of a solvency problem.  Distinguishing a liquidity problem from a 
solvency problem is not necessarily easy. 
Unwillingness to pay.  A country may decide to stop servicing its debt well before it 
is insolvent.  Since debt service payments reduce current incomeand reduce welfare, a 
country may think it can improve welfare by repudiating (not servicing) its debt.   The 
chosen decision not to pay is highly controversial. While debt payments fall, at least 
in the short run, there are other effects (output contraction,  financial crises, etc.) that 
make the welfare decision all but unambiguous.    6
 
Does it matter whether the nonperforming debts of sovereigns are restructured? 
 
  Why do countries repay debt?  The economic literature on debt recognizes the 
inherent problem of moral hazard in uncollateralized borrowing arrangements by debtor 
countries.  This lack of collateral suggests that there must be some alternative incentive 
that prompts sovereigns to repay obligations.  The question that researchers have asked is 
why do sovereigns ever repay their debt?
7  Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that 
sovereigns repay debt because future lending to the sovereign is dependent upon good 
repayment reputation.  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that good reputation is not 
enough to explain lending to sovereigns.  They believe that lending is possible because of 
direct sanctions that creditors can impose on sovereigns.   The importance of reputation 
versus direct sanctions has implications for debt contracts and debt forgiveness.  Bulow 
and Rogoff conclude that if reputation does not matter, then debts that are forgiven will 
be forgotten by the market, and a debtor country should try to negotiate as large a debt 
reduction as possible.
8   
 
  Cole and Kehoe (1992) extend Bulow and Rogoff's model to assume that at any 
moment a country enjoys many types of trust-type relationships (e.g. trade), and that a 
country’s debt relationships have implications for these other relationships.  It then 
follows that a breakdown in a debt relationship will have negative outcomes for other 
relationships.  Cole and Kehoe use this model to explain why countries repay debt, even 
when there are no direct sanctions.   
 
  The one observed economic cost of default is protracted loss in output in 
defaulting countries.  Dooley (2000) argues that the recent crises in emerging markets are 
not liquidity crisis like the Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs, where the existence of a 
lender of last resort - i.e. like a central bank - creates a creditor moral hazard.
9  Instead, 
Dooley suggests that the international financial system is prone to crises because the 
threat of crises and of potential output losses provide an incentive for sovereign 
                                                 
7 Also see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Friedman (2000) for a comprehensive review of the 
literature on this issue. 
8 Thus, Lindert and Mortin (1989) and Eichengreen (1989) find that historical evidence does not 
show that countries that defaulted were shut out of capital markets (for several years in the future) 
to any greater extent than countries that continued to pay their debts.  Indeed, in the 1930s both 
good and bad creditors were unable to borrow.   
  However, there is some recent evidence by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003)  suggesting 
that a borrower’s history matters.  The study finds that countries that have experienced serial 
default might be more vulnerable to a debt crisis as debt burden ratios rise.  Thus “debt 
intolerant” countries have lower “safe” debt burden thresholds than countries with no history of 
debt defaults.  Weak internal institutions – namely, financial systems and fiscal structure - are 
behind the debt intolerance.  The study finds that while countries can graduate from debt 
intolerance, the process is slow and involves strong adherence to structural reforms and to 
keeping low debt ratios low over a long period.    Countries with serial defaults thus face higher 
borrowing costs than those without. 
9 If creditors behave in their collective interest, then losses can be avoided in this type of crisis 
model.   7
borrowers to repay.
10  It is this very threat that makes international lending possible.  
Without this threat, international lending might not be possible.  Thus, creditors have an 
interest in structuring contracts so that creditor coordination is difficult and, therefore, 
renegotiating contracts is difficult (making it less easy for the borrower to default).  This 
is accomplished through equal sharing clauses, where payments made to any one creditor 
can be claimed by other creditors that are not being paid.  Unanimous or near unanimous 
approval for changing payment terms on a contract are another means by which contract 
renegotiation are made costly.  
 
  Rescheduling and restructuring sovereign debt.  Although sovereigns have 
incentives to repay, debt defaults do occur.  The resolution of debt crises has involved 
debt relief ranging from a mere rescheduling of debt service payments to conversion of 
nonperforming debt into new debt with a lower debt service burden to debt write downs.  
The incentives for lenders and borrowers to reschedule or restructure obligations are quite 
different.  The incentive for lenders to negotiate debt restructurings is a wish to recover as 
much as possible of the value of defaulted debt.  Since the unilateral penalty, in terms of 
seizure of assets, that  a lender can impose on the debtor is usually much smaller than the 
contractual value of the debt, there is an incentive to negotiate.  The debtor has the option 
to repudiate debt, but the potential output costs plus the direct costs in terms of seizure of 
assets by creditors are likely to outweigh the benefits of not paying.  Thus, the debtor can 
benefit from negotiating as well.  Both lenders and borrowers can through negotiation 
improve upon the outcome associated with their unilateral positions.  It is these potential 
mutual gains that motivate debt renegotiations.  
 
Even among creditors, banks behave differently from bondholders.
11  This is 
because banks have relationships with lenders, and this relationship is valued because it 
assists in better evaluating borrowers’ credit risk.  A better understanding of risks means 
that banks may be more willing than bondholders to restructure debt.  Also, banks may 
not immediately mark to market and they have more control over the value they can 
assign a nonperforming or potentially nonperforming asset than do bondholders, who are 
required to mark to market on a daily basis.  Since bank balance sheets are not 
immediately affected by nonperforming loans, bank lenders may have more of an 
incentive to try to restructure debt than do bondholders.  
 
  The incentives for borrowers to reschedule or restructure are to minimize the 
output and other economic costs of a default and to improve the country’s debt burden.   
Borrowers benefit from restructuring because it helps them to regain access to markets 
for financing trade and investment, as well as to lower their cost of funds.  The costs of a 
                                                 
10 Dooley distinguishes between strategic default and unavoidable defaults, i.e. defaults  that are a 
result of bad luck. His view is that if the IMF can distinguish between strategic and bad luck 
defaults, and support countries in their negotiations with private creditors in the event of bad luck 
defaults, this will be beneficial in terms of reducing the dead weight loss associated with such a 
default.  
 
11 Friedman (2000). 
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default are likely to be lower, the more orderly and quick is the restructuring.  Of course, 
any improvement in country creditworthiness assumes that there will be no repetition of 
the default .  For a debtor country, the main objectives of any debt operation are to: 
 
•  achieve cash-flow relief, i.e. re-profile debt payments to avoid short-run financing 
needs; 
•  achieve debt relief, i.e. to reduce the debt burden;  
•  avoid holdouts and litigation in the restructuring process; and 
•  normalize access to global financial markets. 
  Cash-flow relief.  In order to obtain cash-flow relief, it is not necessary to default 
on the debt as there is always a price at which the payment profile can be adjusted in a 
voluntary manner.
12  The most straightforward mechanism is a voluntary debt swap, by 
which a maturing debt instrument is exchanged for another debt instrument with similar - 
market value, but a different payment stream.  In the case of bonds, bondholders have 
several reasons to participate in a bond swap.  First, the new issues will certainly be more 
liquid, with holdouts from the exchange risking remaining stuck with an illiquid 
instrument after the exchange.
13  Second, the creditor may fear a default if the bond 
exchange is unsuccessful.  Having said that, voluntary debt exchanges may be more 
feasible when fewer creditors are involved and free rider incentives are weakened. 
  In addition, the new bonds may include a wide range of benefits, generally 
referred to as sweeteners. These can be cash payouts, interest increases, or the offering of 
collaterals or guarantees. Also, they could arise from regulatory and tax prerogatives such 
as tax exemptions, tax-canceling properties, rediscount window privileges and a variety 
of other alternatives.  Finally, sweeteners can include a number of warrants, such as 
exchange warrants - which give the option to increase participation in the exchange in a 
given time period - and extension warrants - which allow to exchange some bonds for 
longer maturity instruments.  Pakistan’s 1999 debt exchange had these features (which?).  
No debt relief was included and substantial upgrades in the interest payment stream were 
offered. As the issue was relatively small and the holdings were fairly concentrated, free 
rider problems were small and this allowed for a mutually beneficial agreement.  
  Cash-flow relief or voluntary debt refinancing can also be obtained by changes in 
regulation that increase the demand for government debt.  For example, allowing banks 
to use government bonds to integrate reserve requirements. Russia, Ukraine and 
Argentina used this mechanism to prop up demand for their debt prior to default.  
Governments also offered to retire debt at face value if debt is used to pay taxes or to 
purchase equity (for example, in privatization offers). While this implies a one-to-one 
reduction in tax collection, if concentrated in short-term instruments, it may create 
demand for short-term rollover.  If it includes longer maturity bonds, it can actually 
aggravate the short-run cash-flow problem if it reduces tax collection.  
                                                 
12 Also see Sturzenegger 2002a. 
13 If the new instruments provide improved liquidity they may be issued at a lower return than 
previous instruments yielding a NPV savings.    9
  For a country that does not expect to default, allowing firms to pay taxes with 
bonds, allows for a substantial tax break for local corporations at the expense of 
bondholders (some of whom may be foreigners).  If a bondholder takes a loss in market 
price, selling it to the local entrepreneur allows this agent to capture immediately the 
benefits of the government’s full compliance with its obligations.  As only the local 
entrepreneur can profit from the tax facility, the mechanism gives an advantage to local 
firms.
14  
  Debt reduction.  The theoretical arguments for debt reduction are the debt 
overhang issue and the Debt Laffer curve.
15  A country with a given amount of external 
debt has to make a choice between how much to consume and invest.  Investing today 
will increase future output.  However, some of this increased output will go towards 
repaying debt.  If claims on future output are large, the incentive to pursue pro-
investment policies may not be strong.  The Debt Laffer curve provides some basis for 
debt reduction as well.  The argument here is that past some maximum point, total 
repayments on debt actually start falling.  Creditors are thus better off canceling some of 
the debt.  
 
  In order to achieve debt reduction, a country has to convince creditors that it 
cannot pay, i.e. that the market value or present value of debt is less than the face value.  
While creditors and debtors may have a common understanding of the sustainability of 
debt and the ability of a country to pay, agreeing on the appropriate market price of 
impaired debt may be more contentious.  Also problematic, is avoiding litigation and 
holdouts from those creditors that choose not to participate.  
 
  Debt reduction deals usually include some short-run sweetener in order to secure 
creditor participation.  Typical sweeteners are cash payouts and increases in the interest 
rates.  Creditor upgrades are also possible incentives to encourage creditor participation.  
Payment guarantees by third parties and collateralization provide incentives to creditors 
as they reduce credit risk.  If neither guarantees nor an upgrade in the quality of the 
lender are possible, an alternative is to upgrade the instrument, i.e. offering a more liquid 
instrument, a more reliable jurisdiction, better terms in the covenants of the issue, or 
instruments with tax or accounting advantages.  Indexation and growth clauses, also 
known as value recovery rights or economic and credit-linked warrants, allow some 
bondholders or creditors to share in the benefits of their effort in granting debt relief.  The 
mechanism is a clause in which the payment is associated to some macroeconomic factor 
such as the price of an export commodity or output growth. While these factors have not 
been very common in recent defaults value recovery rights remain an interesting option 
as they approximate bonds to shares, therefore aligning the interests of the countries and 
bondholders.  In some cases, for example linking the recovery value to GDP performance 
may carry moral hazard risks if it is the country itself that produces the national statistics, 
however, linking the performance to commodity prices or other well defined asset price 
                                                 
14 However, a secondary market for these instruments could develop which may allow for a 
sharing of the benefits. 
15 See Perasso (199 ) and Sachs (1988). 
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reduces this risk significantly. The relative modest use of this instrument remains an open 
question.  Puts and acceleration clauses are other ways of enhancing instruments.  
 
  Avoiding litigation and holdouts.  The third objective is that of avoiding holdouts 
and litigation. These two come together as holdout creditors, who do not accept a 
restructuring, take legal action to obtain better terms.  They also bet on a successful 
conclusion of the restructuring, because this reduces the relative importance of their 
claims and increases the likelihood of a favorable settlement. This is the mechanics by 
which so-called vulture funds operate.
16  However, while sovereigns can now be held 
legally accountable for their commercial contracts with foreign counter parties in the 
same manner as private parties,
17 accessing assets that can be attached is difficult.
18,19 
 
  One mechanism by which a country can reduce litigation risk to a minimum, is 
through the introduction of collective action clauses, CACs (Annex 2) .  By allowing a 
supermajority of creditors to change payment terms, CACs  make the restructuring 
process easier and reduce the incentives for maverick litigation.
20  CACs are more easily 
                                                 
16 Contrary to what is sometimes believed, vulture funds generate strong stabilization forces by 
buying a country’s debt when it is very cheap. While the US courts do not allow the purchasing 
bond issues for the sole purpose of suing the creditors, this objective is unverifiable and thus its 
bite as a deterrent for vulture funds rather limited. 
17 See Buchheit (1995, 1997).  
18 We believe the threat of litigation has been grossly overstated. Roubini (2002) considers a 
number of reasons for why the risk of litigation is less than what has usually been considered. The 
most important are:  
1)  Unilateral exchange offers have turned out to be very successful, with large participation. 
2)  Exit consents dilute the benefits of a holdout. 
3)  Sweeteners associated to the exchange can be used to entice all bondholders. 
4)  It is not clear that a holdout will be able to recover the full value of its liabilities. As long 
as the exchange provides mark to market gains there are ample incentives to participate. 
5)  The risk of the new instruments may be lower, increasing the perceived value of the 
newly issued instruments and providing incentive for participation. 
6)  Large financial institutions and large players have an incentive to  keep a good working 
relation with the government and thus avoid litigation. 
7)  The Elliot decision (vis-à-vis Peru) will probably not hold if challenged in court. 
8)  The use of CACs can be effectively used to reduce the benefits of litigation. 
9)  Vulture funds have all the incentives to see a successful exchange in order to increase 
their chances in litigation.  
19 Sovereign immunity historically prevented bondholders from suing sovereign debtors. The 
origin of this principle was an attempt to foster the well being between nations, by protecting a 
country from being sued in potentially biased foreign courts. With the years, and with many 
national companies (i.e. owned by the sovereign) conducting business in other countries, the 
absolute version of the sovereign immunity was left aside. The United States started to use a more 
restrictive approach in 1952 that was codified in 1976 in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 
The UK adopted similar legislation in 1978. 
20 See Becker et al. (2001).   11
introduced in issues under London Law than New York Law.  London Law allows for 
changes in the conditions of the bonds under majority ruling, whereas New York Law 
does not allow changing payment conditions of a bond except with unanimity, although 
non-payment amendments can be made.  Recently, CACs have been introduced in bonds 
issued under New York Law.  
 
  While the literature has focused on international litigation, domestic litigation 
should not be disregarded. If a country defaults on its own citizens, these have the right to 
pursue the case in domestic courts, and, barring the case of a completely corrupt judicial 
system, they may have certain power to obtain favorable court rulings. Notably, in this 
case, attachments may be much more feasible. For example, Argentina has faced a 
number of legal actions called amparos (protection of constitutional rights) when the 
government attempted to change the terms of the domestic bond exchange by changing 
their currency of denomination from dollars to pesos at the conversion rate 1.4 pesos for 
each dollar (when the market rate was closer to 3).  The government used an economic 
emergency law to justify the swap, but the Supreme Court, in a related recent ruling 
regarding the deposit freeze stated that the emergency law cannot be used to wipe out the 
property rights.
21  Whether the Supreme Court would take a similar stance regarding the 
resolution of the amparos relating to the domestic bond exchange is still unclear at this 
time. In the Argentine default the government is facing massive litigation in local courts, 




  Conclusion.  Clearly, both lenders and borrowers can potentially benefit when 
defaulted debt is rescheduled or restructured.  While debt rescheduling and restructuring 
can ameliorate payment difficulties, Friedman (2000) argues that some nonperforming 
debts should not be restructured.  Some amount of defaults should be allowed as a market 
process, so that investors can better price borrower risks.  By forcing defaults to be at 
artificially low levels, cross-border flows are higher than they would be in an 
environment of higher defaults.  Thus the aim of debt markets should not be merely 
maximizing debt flows; rather it should also appropriately evaluate risk.   
 
 
Section III:  Approaches to resolving debt defaults in the 1990s 
 
  Historical evidence suggests that cross-border lending to sovereigns has generally 
been characterized by cycles of boom and bust.  Excessive lending tends to raise debt 
burdens and make borrowers vulnerable to sudden stoppages or reversal of flows.  When 
                                                 
21 The case is Smith contra Poder Ejecutivo Nacional.  
22 Recently Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2001) have suggested that lending should be forced through 
local courts in order to insure solvency, as there the legal rights of the claimants are more exposed 
to the arbitrariness of local jurisdiction and legislation, so that foreign investors will be enticed 
only under very solid circumstances. Barring the experience of Russia and Ukraine, which seems 
to suggest otherwise, if litigation in domestic courts is easier than in foreign courts, given the ease 
of attachability, then such proposal will lead to less responsible lending rather than more 
responsible lending.    12
flows reverse they have often resulted in debt payment difficulties debt crises.  Like their 
historical counterparts, recent day debtor countries have encountered debt problems and 
even full-blown debt crises.  What is surprising, however, is that the frequency and, 
perhaps, intensity of crises seem to have risen (Chart 1, Table 1).
23  Thus, the 1980s debt 
crisis followed on the heels of a bank lending boom that began after the first oil shock of  
1973.  In 1982, in response to a substantial hike in interest rates in the US, Mexico 
declared a moratorium on its debt, triggering the beginning of a debt crisis that lasted 
through the early 1990s.  Once the default in Mexico occurred, banks withdrew from 
other emerging markets leading to a domino effect that triggered defaults in a large 
number of developing economies.  The debt crises lasted for nearly a decade as 
successive approaches were adopted in resolving the crises.  
 
  In the 1990s, lending to emerging markets was characterized by periods of high 
growth followed by sharp contractions or reversals of these flows.  The early 1990s saw 
resumption in private lending that was led by bond investors.  Debt flows nearly tripled 
over 1991-93, before collapsing in the wake of the Mexican Tequila crisis that occurred 
at the end of 1994.  Flows resumed in 1995 reaching a peak of $110 billion in 1996.  
Again, debt flows collapsed in the midst of the East Asian crisis of 1997 and were further 
affected by the debt crisis in Russia in 1998.
24  The crises in Korea and Indonesia led to 
debt rescheduling arrangements backed by sovereign guarantees for these countries 
(Annex 4).  The crisis in Russia led to a default on domestic debt followed shortly after 
by a default on external debt.  This marked the beginning of a string of new restructuring 
experiences.  In the following four years, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador and Argentina all 
defaulted or had to restructure under the threat of default.   
 
Standard and Poor’s survey of default episodes finds 84 events of sovereign 
default on private-source debt between 1975-2002 (Annex 1), with many countries 
experiencing serial defaults.  S&P’s definition of default is somewhat broad, ranging 
from missed principal and or interest payments as well as outright repudiation.  There is 
thus considerable variation in the severity of default episodes.  Nevertheless, the 
relatively large incidence of payment difficulties demonstrates the fact that debt 
difficulties are far from uncommon in emerging market economies.  Both rated and non-
rated sovereign issuers have experienced defaults on private debt.  The survey includes 
both external and local-currency debt defaults, although the frequency of external debt 
default is much higher at a ratio of 10 to 1. 
 
                                                 
23 Also see Footnote 2. 
24 These crises were mostly associated with collapsing pegged exchange rate regimes.   13
 
 
Chart 1: Net flows and transfers on commercial bank  















   
Table 1 
                        Table: Volatility of private debt flows
1970-82 1983-89 1990-02
Private debt flows/GNI (%)
Mean 1.77 0.73 0.93
S.D 0.71 0.23 0.89
Private debt flows/Exports (%)
Mean 3.83 3.8
S.D 1.32 3.48
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Approaches to resolving debt defaults in the 1980s  
 
  Dealing with the 1980s debt crisis.  When the debt crisis erupted in 1982, 
policymakers and market participants were acutely concerned over the potential systemic 
risk that it posed to the international financial system and the associated disruption of 
international trade and finance.
25  There was a realization that creditors and debtors 
needed to cooperate so as to allow countries to grow out of their debt problems and re-
access capital markets.
26  A formal framework was initiated to facilitate debt 
agreements.
27  Banks gathered in a consortium with the purpose of conducting debt 
renegotiations. The strategy that was adopted can be thought of has having three phases.
28   
The common elements of the three phases were rescheduling of debt maturities to 
provide front-loaded cash-flow relief to debtors along with provision of new money by 
creditor banks.  The incentives for banks to participate were that this strategy maintained 
the face-value of developing country claims on their books, and it also meant that they 
would benefit from any future improvement in countries’ ability to service debt.  For 
debtor countries the incentives were that it provided them with near term cash flow relief 
and new money.  The 1980s new money approach was designed to address a liquidity 
problem as opposed to resolving a sustainability issue.    
 
  New money approach – first phase.  The first phase was an immediate response 
to the Mexico crisis, and it emphasized adjustment and austerity.  Under this approach, 
which was supported by the U.S. administration, countries adopted IMF approved 
adjustment programs and commercial banks rescheduled maturing debt obligations over a 
short period – usually one to two years - and debt in arrears.  Banks also maintained 
short-term credit lines and provided new money commitments, which partially covered 
interest payments.  The feature of new money by banks did not represent voluntary 
lending.  Countries were also able to access short-term bridge financing from major 
creditor governments.  Mexico was the test case for this approach.  In August 1983, the 
country reached agreement with its creditor banks to reschedule $23.3 billion of 
maturities, and during 1983-84 Mexico also obtained two new money agreements totaling 
$8.9 billion.  In turn, the austerity measures adopted by the government shifted the 
current account from a deficit to a surplus.  During 1983-84, 47 rescheduling agreements 
were negotiated, covering $130 billion.  Principal coming due over 1-2 years was 
rescheduled.  The typical terms on rescheduled debt were eight-year maturity and four-
year grace, with an interest margin of 1 ¾ - 2 ½ percent.  A major limitation of the first 
                                                 
25 Clark (1992) shows that the high exposure of banks to developing country debt was behind the 
concern over the vulnerability of the international financial system.  The exposure of US money 
center banks to restructuring developing countries at end-1982 was 215% of banks’ capital and 
260% of equity.  The exposure of UK and Canadian banks at the end-1984 were about 275% and 
195% of equity, respectively. 
26 As noted earlier, intervention by officials - creditor governments or multilateral institutions - in 
resolving debt crises was a new phenomenon.  
27 The framework for negotiating bank debt developed in line with the Paris Club framework for 
official debt. 
28 Lawrence Brainard (1985).   15
phase was the focus on the near term and lack of a framework for promoting medium-
term growth in crisis countries.  
 
  New money approach – second phase.   The shift to a second phase began in 
1984, and represented an improvement over the first phase.   Now, the approach to 
managing the debt crisis moved from a near-term to a longer term focus with a view to 
normalizing bank lending to developing countries.  Instead of rescheduling maturities on 
a year-to-year basis, the new approach advocated multiyear rescheduling -  MYRAs.  
Under this approach, banks agreed to reschedule debt maturing within three to five years.  
The terms on rescheduled debt were also more favorable at maturities of 9-14 years.  
Banks also provided concessions in terms of narrower interest rate spreads on 
rescheduled debt and elimination of rescheduling fees.  In turn, banks were not required 
to pledge new money, i.e. no forced lending.  The obvious benefit to debtor countries was 
that it lowered debt servicing amounts over longer period, providing significant cash-flow 
relief.  While IMF conditionality was still an important aspect of this approach, the 
economic adjustment that was required under IMF programs was less severe.  Eight 
countries (2 agreements for Mexico) rescheduled their debt using the MYRA framework.  
Like the first phase, this approach lacked a focus on promoting medium-term growth. 
 
  New money approach – the Baker Plan.  In October 1985, the United States 
unveiled the Baker Plan.  The third phase of handling the debt crisis marked an important 
departure from the two earlier approaches in that it recognized the need for fostering 
economic growth.  The Baker Plan advocated structural adjustment and market-oriented 
policies for market generating growth.  Another key element of the plan was increased 
lending by commercial banks.  In association with an IMF program, participation of 
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank was greatly enhanced.  The Plan 
envisaged net commercial bank lending of $20 billion over 1986-88 and multilateral 
development bank net lending of $9 billion.   
 
  A fundamental premise of the debt resolution of the 1980s, including the Baker 
Plan, was that all similarly situated commercial creditor banks should be treated equally, 
both in terms of rescheduling of their existing exposure as to their proportional 
participation in new credit facilities.  From a legal standpoint, this equal treatment was 
ensured through a series of contractual provisions in the rescheduling deals such as 
sharing clauses, mandatory prepayment provisions, negative pledge clauses and pari-
passu covenants.  However, syndication of all loans could not be compelled legally so 
some degree of moral suasion remained necessary.  This monolithic approach implied 
complete ignorance on the specifics of each bank, and this, in the end, was responsible 
for some delays and difficulties in reaching agreements.  Thus, over the years new 
flexibility had to be introduced in order to suit the differences both of different creditors 
and debtors. In all cases, however, debt forgiveness was off the table as an alternative.
29  
In order to solve the free rider problem among commercial banks, several sweeteners 
were offered to those participating in the rescheduling.   
 
                                                 
29 However, banks were slowly building provisions to exit from developing country risk 
exposure.   16
  Although 10 countries negotiated debt agreements with commercial banks, the 
level of net bank lending fell far short of the Baker Plan targets.  Indeed, public sector 
borrowers only received $4 billion of net bank flows.  However, several middle-income 
countries were able to negotiate better terms.  
 
  The new money approach failed to resolve the 1980s debt crisis.  The success of 
the new money approach in managing the debt crisis was recognized as being rather 
uneven.  While systemic risk to the international financial system was contained, the 
goals of lowering the indebtedness of crisis countries and normalizing their access to 
financial markets was not achieved.  Indeed, the main failure of this approach was that 
debtor countries were unable to exit from the cycle of debt rescheduling.  There are 
several reasons for this.  First, rescheduling of maturities provided cash-flow relief for a 
relatively short period.  New money packages only partially covered interest payments on 
existing debt.  Thus, if payment capacity did not improve quickly, additional 
rescheduling or new money was needed.  Second, new money packages combined with 
rescheduling increased the stock of debt, and contributed to a debt overhang problem.  
Crisis countries apparently, had little incentive to grow in the face of mounting debt and 
debt service.  Third, a continuous cycle of rescheduling deterred normalization of bank 
lending.  Thus external finance for new investment and growth was not forthcoming.  
Also, by the mid-1980s, new money packages became increasingly difficult to negotiate 
as smaller banks were looking to reduce exposure to developing country debt.  Lastly, 
debt rescheduling negotiations were usually long drawn out and costly.  Banks had 
diverse business objectives, and getting all creditor banks to sign on to what was agreed 
by the banks’ advisory committee was time consuming.  For small banks there was also a 
free rider problem, as these banks could potentially benefit, at no cost, from the efforts of 
the larger banks:  small banks could share in interest payments facilitated by new money, 
without contributing to it.   
 
   17
Table 2 
Characteristics of the new Money Approach and the performance of gdp growth and net 
debt transfers in default countries 
 
New money :   Formal mechanism to facilitate cooperation among debtors and creditor 
approach  banks. 
                          Phase 1 1982-84 
  Phase 2  1984-85 
    Phase 3 - Baker plan 1985-89 
 
Goal :    Avert a systemic disruption of international finance and trade. 
Gain time for debtor countries to improve their debt-servicing capacity. 
Get debtor countries back on a sustainable growth path. 
Restore debtor countries’ access to the international capital markets.   
 
Features:   Countries remain current on interest payments and adopt adjust aggregate 
consumption and investment.  In later periods the emphasis was on structural 
reform.   
No menu of options for banks.   
Banks reschedule amortization payments falling due and in arrears:  
Phase 1 - maturities falling due in 1 -2 years were rescheduled at average  
terms of 8 years maturity and 4 years grace, and 1 7/8 percent interest spread; 
Phase 2 MYRAs - maturities falling due in 3- 5 years were rescheduled at terms 
of 9-14 years maturity and 1 3/8 percent interest spread; &  
Phase 3 Baker Plan - better terms on rescheduled debt, i.e. up to 20 years 
maturity and interest spreads as low as 13/16 percent.   
Banks maintain short-term credit lines, and extend new loans to partially 
refinance interest obligations.   
Multilateral creditors increased lending; initially IMF and then WB (under the 
Baker Plan)  
    Addresses a liquidity problem not a solvency problem. 
 
Rescheduling:  47 rescheduling agreements during 1982-84, covering $130 billion of debt. 
Episodes          8 MYRAs during 1985-86, covering $81 billion of debt. 
                        10 Baker Plan rescheduling agreements during 1985-88, covering $165 
                         billion of debt. 
 
Impact on  GDP growth rate =  xx% 
debtors   Net transfers on debt to private creditors = $xx 
    Transfer private external debt obligations to the public sector 
 
Impact on  New money by banks in Phase 1= $xx, in Phase 2=$xx, and in Phase 
                          3=$xx 
Creditors  New financing by multilaterals $xx 
 
Results   Systemic risks to banks contained.  
                          Repeated rescheduling by debtor countries and no exit from debt trap. 
                          Banks reluctant to extend new money because of risk of repeated 
                          rescheduling. 
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Approaches to resolving debt defaults in the 1990s 
 
  Dealing with the 1990s debt crises.  The 1990s defaults were characterized by 
loan defaults in the early part of the 1990s and bond defaults towards the end of the 
decade (also included are defaults through 2002).  At the start of the decade, there was a 
growing recognition that persistently high or rising debt burdens were indicative of 
insolvency problems rather than illiquidity problems.  This called for a paradigm shift in 
the response to crises and in crisis resolution.  By 1990, market-based approaches to 
resolving debt crisis had gained favor.  These approaches recognized the loss of value of 
nonperforming debt, as well as the issue of sustainability of debt and the need to provide 
an exit strategy for countries from a debt trap.  A new formal mechanism for restructuring 
defaulted loans – the Brady Plan - was introduced.  The Brady Plan was generally viewed 
as a success, as major restructuring countries were able to re-enter international capital 
markets.   
 
  At the private sector level the shift in policy favoring debt reduction had been in 
the making for sometime. During the later part of the decade a secondary debt market had 
appeared for developing country debt, trading at sizable discounts.  The realization that 
losses had already been incurred pushed debtor countries to try to share the benefits from 
honoring their commitments.  On the other hand, the development of the secondary 
market put pressure on banks that had not sold off their loans, as they feared that at some 
point they would be called to mark to market the value of such loans.  In fact, Citibank 
started along this path in May 1987 by posting loan loss provisions against its LDC debt.  
Thus, towards the later part of the 80s, the equilibrium became unstable and started 
veering naturally towards some kind of debt reduction.  For the banks this was further 
enhanced by the fact that tax benefits would accrue only upon the granting of the debt 
relief.  
 
  Indeed, Mexico offered a preview of the Brady deal in late 1987 by offering an 
exchange of bank loans for a new Mexican bond with a 20 year maturity and with 
principal collateralized with US zero coupon treasuries. The reception to this instrument, 
without interest collateral, was muted. Principal discounts offered were in the order of 
30% but only a fraction of the amount Mexico was prepared to exchange was subscribed. 
Obviously, more resources had to be put on the table to provide additional enhancements 
to switch out of the original loans. There seems to be a missing step here from this 
negative outlook of the Mexico deal and the following paragraph which goes straight into 
the boom. 
 
  The return of emerging market countries to the global capital market in 1991, 
started a new lending boom.  Private debt flows in the form of bond financing to these 
countries surged.  Beginning in the latter part of the decade, however, there were several 
episodes of bond defaults and distress bond exchanges.  Most of these credit events were 
resolved through market-based informal mechanisms, that represent a muddling through 
approach.  What is remarkable about these debt exchanges is that the speed with which 
these cases were resolved contrasts strongly with  the  view that sovereign bond   19
exchanges were extremely difficult to undertake.  There are several reasons behind the 
perceived difficulty of such bond operations, including coordinating negotiations with an 
increasingly large number of diverse and anonymous investors that hold bonds and the 
potential for hold-out investors to disrupt negotiations. 
 
  Loan defaults of the early 1990s and the Brady Plan.  In a bid to overcome the 
shortcomings of the new money approach of the 1980s, the US introduced the Brady Plan 
in March 1989.
30  This plan signaled a major shift in the official position to managing the 
debt crisis.  Under the new approach, there was official support and encouragement of 
debt reduction packages that could resolve pending debt issues and re-open market access 
for many of these economies. In fact, the Brady Plan mandated multilaterals to increase 
lending in support of these debt operations. (it seems the chronology is not linear) 
 
  The major distinguishing elements of the Brady Plan were debt relief through a 
menu of market-based options ranging from debt stock reduction to new money to 
rescheduling of principal and interest.  The menu approach addressed the issue of 
increasingly divergent business goals of banks with  exposure to developing countries.  
Banks could chose the option that best suited their business interests.  So if banks wished 
to exit from the country, they could chose the debt reduction option.  Those wishing to 
stay on and benefit from the resulting improved debt burden of the country were expected 
to provide new money.  The benefit to debtor countries were lower debt burden through 
debt reduction, debt service reduction, and/or substantial extension of the time horizon of 
contractual relief.  Lower debt burdens improved countries’ prospects of exiting from the 
cycle of debt renegotiations.  Along with a reduction in countries’ debt burden, 
implementation of a strong, growth-oriented policy framework was critical to resolving 
the debt situation.   
 
  Menu approach – The menu approach addressed the issue of increasingly 
divergent business goals of banks.  It provided these banks with a market-based menu of 
options from which banks could choose.  The Brady deals included a number of 
relatively standard instruments. 
 
Par or Discount bonds.  Pars were loans exchanged for fixed rate bonds issued 
with below-market interest rates at par.  Discounts were floating rate bonds, 
issued with market interest rates, but with a capital write-off.  Both were backed 
by a US Treasury zero coupon bond for principal collateral.  These bonds had 
long-term maturities, were expected to be very liquid, and had a long average life 
and bullet amortization.  They represent the most common Brady bonds 
outstanding. 
 
Front Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRB’s).  In this case loans were 
exchanged for medium term step-up bonds at below-market interest rates for the 
initial 5 to 7 years, and then at a floating rate for the remainder of the term.  These 
bonds provided partial interest collateral in the form of cash, with collateral rolled 
                                                 
30 The plan is named after US Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady, successor of Secretary 
James Baker.   20
over for subsequent periods upon timely interest payments.  While these were less 
liquid than the par/discounts, they had a much shorter average life, as 
amortization payments began ordinarily after 5-7 years.  
 
Interest Arrears Capitalization. Commercial banks had rescheduled interest in 
arrears of Brazilian, Argentine and Ecuadorian debt, capitalizing the interest into 
new short-term floating rate bonds, called Interest Due or Unpaid Bonds –as in 
Brazil’s IDU and Ecuador’s PDI. These bonds had been issued prior to the 
rescheduling of principal into the Brady format. 
 
Debt Conversion Bonds or New Money Bonds.  In some cases countries were 
believed to have the ability to pay their foreign loans, but had so far been 
unwilling to service the debt.  The initiation of a Brady deal was a sign of a new 
willingness to repay foreign debt, augmenting the creditworthiness of the 
countries.  Thus creditors exchanged loans for bonds at par, and even provided 
additional funds to the Brady issuing nation, at a floating rate of interest through 
the so called New Money Bonds.  They include short-term floating rate bonds as 
issued by Venezuela, Uruguay and the Philippines and carried no collateral. 
 
  The menu approach advocated by the Brady Plan allowed banks to choose the 
options that were most appropriate to their particular situation: their external situation in 
terms of the accounting and regulatory environment as well as internal situation in terms 
of banks' policies.  The possibility that one option might be picked more often that 
another, thereby undermining the menu approach, was an issue.   The menu approach, 
however, encouraged wide participation by banks in restructuring agreements.   
 
  Another favorable aspect of the Brady bonds was that they were structured as an 
inviolable set of instruments.  Not only were they issued according to New York Law, 
which does not allow for bondholders to change the payment conditions of the bonds 
unless there is unanimity, but they included a series of provisions which made them 
practically default risk free.  Among these provisions were (i) mandatory prepayment 
clauses that restrict not ratable prepayments to others, (ii) turnover clauses that require 
creditors receiving preferential prepayments to turn these payments over to others, (iii) 
the sharing clause that requires a creditor to share what he receives with others, (iv) the 
negative pledge clause that requires other lenders are not to be given a preference by 
having assets pledged to them and (v) the acceleration clause wherein a creditor who 
holds defaulted debt can ask for all the debt to be paid immediately.  
 
  The Brady Plan was designed to reduce countries’ debt and debt-service burdens.  
This improvement was achieved through permanent cash-flow relief resulting from debt 
stock reduction and lower interest rates.
31  Thus Brady-style debt restructurings lowered 
                                                 
31 The debt restructuring operations required up-front financing for purchasing collateral for 
bonds, repaying arrears, and buybacks.  A large amount of the financing was provided by official 
sources, with debtor countries also making a significant contribution. Brady agreements also 
continued to support debt conversion schemes as a way to reduce debt burden.  Under these 
agreements, countries typically agreed to convert a minimum level of debt into …  Although   21
the PV of debt.  However, net transfers on debt under the Brady Plan were not much 
different from those in the pre-Brady period.  So while countries debt burdens improved, 
restructuring countries did not on average receive higher financing.  There was 
considerable variation among countries, however.  Thus, countries like Argentina and 
Brazil that were in nonpayment status experienced an increase in debt service payments 
as relations with creditors were normalized.  By contrast, countries that were already 
paying their creditor banks, found that their debt service was reduced.  While the cash-
flow relief in the near term was about the same as under the Baker plan, it was the longer 
term improvement in sustainability of debt that was critical.   
 
  The Brady deal was considered a success.  It normalized the relations between 
creditors and debtors and opened up a new era of resumed lending to emerging 
economies.  While there were many factors behind the surge in financial flows to 
emerging markets, the resolution of the countries’ debt problems is an important 
contributing factor to renewed flows.  However, some of the characteristics of the deal, 
particularly the stepped up characteristic of the interest payments included in some 
bonds, would impose an unsustainable burden on some debtors 10 years later.  In 
addition, the belief that a default free instrument had been found also was proven false.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
conversions picked up during 1989-19xx, and were important in countries like Argentina and 
Chile, the overall size of conversions was low.  (data from GDF) . 
   22
Table 3 
Characteristics of the Brady Plan and the performance of gdp growth and net transfers on 
debt in default countries 
 
Brady Plan :      Introduced in March 1989.  
Formal mechanism to facilitate more efficient cooperation among debtors and 
creditor banks. 
 
Goal :               Address the shortcomings of the Baker Plan. 
Address the diverse business interests of creditor banks, i.e. some banks wanted 
to exit emerging markets while others did not. 
Break the cycle of continuous debt renegotiations. 
Improve countries debt-servicing capacity through debt and debt service 
reduction. 
Get debtor countries back on a sustainable growth path. 
Restore debtor countries’ access to the international capital markets.   
 
Features:           Market-based approach recognizing the market value of impaired debt. 
Reduction in PV of debt through debt and debt-service reduction. 
Menu of options for banks recognizes the diversity of banks’ business interests. 
The choice of either debt reduction or new concerted lending, limited the free 
rider problem.  
Addresses a debt solvency problem. 
 
Debt reduction 
  discount bonds 
  buybacks 
Debt-service reduction 
  interest reduction bonds or par bonds 
  front loaded interest reduction bonds 
New money with or without conversion bonds 
 
Results:             18 countries have had Brady operations restructuring $200 billion of bank claims 
for $154 billion of bonds. 
 
Impact on  GDP growth rate =  xx% 
debtors   Net transfers on debt to private creditors = $xx 
Up-front cash requirement for DDSR operations - buybacks, purchase of 





Results   Renewed access to global capital markets for restructuring countries. 
Exit from the continuous cycle of restructuring. 
   23
 
  Bond defaults of the late 1990s and a muddling through approach.  The past 
several years have seen a spate of both large and small sovereign bond exchange 
operation, many of them of “distressed” debt.  What is remarkable about these bond 
operations is that there has been no formal mechanism for resolving debt problems.  
Moreover, the approach has varied from case-to-case.  The overall situation can best be 
described as one of muddling through.  
 
  Until fairly recently, the popular view was that sovereign bond exchanges were 
extremely difficult to undertake.  There are several reasons behind the perceived 
difficulty of such bond operations.  First, is an increasingly large number of diverse and 
anonymous investors that hold bonds.  The diverse goals of private bondholders and their 
large numbers pose difficulties of coordination (compare this to a handful of creditor 
banks under the loan restructurings of the 1980s).  Second, is the legal recourse available 
to bondholders, which can disrupt bond restructuring negotiations as hold-out investors 
seek repayment through national courts.
32  Indeed, the threat of such a disruption may 
actually deter a country from seeking a necessary restructuring.
33  
 
  Recent sovereign bond exchanges like those of Pakistan, Ukraine, Ecuador, and 
Argentina (June 2001) demonstrated that bond exchange operations may be relatively 
easy to implement and can be completed in a short period.
34  The experience from these 
bond exchanges also suggests that high investor participation may be achieved without 
the use of collective action clauses.
35  Moreover, the fears that litigation would disrupt 
some of these bond operations were not realized.  With over $520 billion in emerging 
market bonds, and about $400 billion in public and publicly guaranteed bonds, the recent 
bond exchanges are significant as they provide a precedent for future sovereign bond 
exchanges of distressed debt.  
 
  A bond exchange operation can be voluntary or concerted (involuntary).  In a 
voluntary operation, the market price of the exchange is expected to be higher than the 
pre-exchange price, with the investor likely to get all the benefit of the price increase.  
Voluntary exchanges are also likely to include sweeteners in terms of higher interest rates 
and more liquid or tradable bonds to attract investor participation.  The benefit to the 
debtor is to achieve a re-profiling of its debt service, so as to reduce rollover risk in the 
near and medium-term.  For example, Argentina’s “mega” bond exchange lowered debt 
service payments in 2001-03 (Figure 2).  Voluntary exchanges typically do not lower the 
present value of debt, however.  A concerted approach, by contrast, will likely involve a 
                                                 
32 Holdout creditors are those creditors who are unwilling to accept a bond restructuring by the 
sovereign.  These creditors are usually small in number, but can exhibit opportunistic behavior 
that can derail a bond restructuring. 
33 See Krueger (2001, 2002). 
34 See Chuhan (2001). 
35 Inclusion of collective action clauses or CACs in bond contracts are viewed as being potentially 
helpful in bond restructurings, because they allow for collective representation of bondholders 
and for qualified majority voting to change payment terms on bonds.  Changing terms may force 
holdout investors to join the majority of investors.  Also see Annex 2.   24
haircut for investors and a subsequent debt reduction for the debtor.  A default may also 






















  Recent examples of voluntary bond exchanges of “distressed” debt were Pakistan 
in late 1999 and Ukraine in early 2000 (Annex 3).  (Caution: Ukraine did actually default 
on its debt). Argentina’s mega bond exchange of June 2001 represented a voluntary 
exchange during a period of heightened credit risk for the country.
36  The amount of 
bonds exchanged by Pakistan and Ukraine totaled $2.8 billion, while the Argentine mega 
bond exchange involved $29.5 billion.  All three countries provided some form of 
sweetener to enhance investor participation.  For example, the terms offered by Pakistan 
on the new bond provided a sweetener relative to the prevailing market price of the bond, 
and the size and structure of the new bond implied that this instrument would be more 
liquid than the original bonds.  These factors, along with a relatively narrow and small 
investor base - mostly institutional investors – yielded a high investor participation rate - 
near 99%.  The high investor participation rate meant that collective action clauses did 
not need to be invoked in the Pakistan bond exchange.  Ukraine provided a $220 million 
pay-out of accrued interest to boost investor participation, and it also used collective 
action clauses in three of its bonds to boost investor participation.  The new bonds issued 
under Argentina’s bond exchange operation had a higher average yield than the old 




                                                 





















  Two recent examples of concerted bond exchanges were the bond restructurings 
by Ecuador and Russia (notes for bonds).
37  Both these bond operations involved debt 
reduction, and the amounts of bonds exchanged were $38.4 billion, with Russia 
accounting for $31.8 billion.  Ecuador’s bond exchange operation involving defaulted 
Brady bonds and eurobonds, and resulted in a 41% reduction in principal for 
bondholders.  Investor participation in the deal was about 97%, well over the 85% 
acceptance level.  One factor that encouraged participation was the government’s offer to 
pay bondholders $140 million of past-due principal and interest on defaulted bonds.  Exit 
amendments to cross default and negative pledge clauses in the old bonds, by investors 
who were tendering their old bonds for new bonds, and an amendment to de-list the 
bonds, pushed up the investor participation rate as well.
38  Ecuador’s bond restructuring 
(from default to bond exchange) was completed in about one year:  a relatively short time 
period compared to the loan restructuring episodes of the 1980s.  Although Ecuador’s 
bond exchange offer involved a haircut for creditors, the country did not engage in formal 
negotiation with its bondholders.  A Consultative Group comprising large institutional 
investors was set up, but the function of this group was to provide a medium for 
communication between the government and the creditor community and not to negotiate 
the terms of the offer.   
 
  Russia’s debt operation exchanged Vnesheconombank’s $31.8 billion of Prins and 
IANs for $21 billion of new instruments - Eurobonds of the Russian Federation due in 
2010 and 2030.  The restructuring carried a substantial principal reduction: 37.5% for 
Prins and 33% for IANs.  The deal had many interesting features. Among these:
39  
a)  There was an upgrade in the obligor, as creditors had had relatively limited legal 
recourse after the December 1998 default on the Prins and IANs, because Russia 
                                                 
37 Argentina defaulted on its debt is 2002 and this default has not been resolved yet. 
38 Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, 2000, “Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges,”  
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 48, Number 1.  
39 See JP Morgan (1997 and 2000). 
Argentina* Pakistan Ukraine Ecuador Russia
Jun-01 Nov-99 Feb-00 Aug-00 Aug-00
Debt Eligible $29.5 billion $0.61 billion $2.7 billion $6.7 billion $31.8 billion
Debt Reduction No debt reduction No debt reduction No debt reduction Average of 40% Average of 36.5%
Amounts Exchanged $29.5 billion $0.61 billion $2.3 billion $6.6 billion $31.8 billion
Exchange Bonds Issued $30.4 billion $0.62 billion $2.3 billion $3.95 billion $21.14 billion
5-year local bond 5-year eurobond 7-year eurobond in US$ 30-year and 30-year and
7-year, 17-year, and and Euro 12-year eurobonds 10-year eurobonds
30-year global bonds
Voluntary Approach Concerted Approach
EXTERNAL BOND EXCHANGES  26
did not guarantee the debt incurred by Vnesheconombank.  Now it assumed that 
debt directly.  
b)  Expanded Cross Acceleration Clauses by which the country committed to include 
in any new issues clauses to ensure equal status in the event of default or 
acceleration of the 2010 and 2030s. The clauses would be symmetric, tying 
default on the 2010 and 2030 to new issues of sovereign Eurobonds.  
c)  In order to have these bonds rank pari-passu with other Eurobonds, holders of  
existing and other new issues of the Russian Federation would have the right to 
put back to Russia at par those bonds, in the event of acceleration of the 2010 and 
2030.  This repurchase right would expire once Russia issued at least 1 billion of 
new Eurobonds, as Russia committed to include expanded cross acceleration 
clauses tied to 2010 and 2030 in new issues.  
d)  MinFins as domestic debt remained subordinated.  
e)  Initially, a minimum threshold of 75% of bondholders was needed to consummate 
the exchange if less than 19 billion was tendered. However, if this happened and 
Russia wanted to go ahead with the exchange, it had the option open upon 
requesting consent from creditors to do so.  
f)  Russia retained the right to re-tap both the 2010s and 2030s without prior notice. 
This was included to allow for additional restructuring of FTO paper, and did not 
work against the deal.
40 
Figure 3 
Russia:  Impact of the August 2000 bond restructuring on debt service 
 
                                                 
40 FTO paper corresponds to unsecured and uninsured foreign exchange assets of Foreign Trading 
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The experience from the five bond exchanges discussed above suggests that these 
operations may be relatively easy to implement and can be completed in a short period, 
despite the lack of a formal mechanism for bond workouts.  These bond exchanges were 
also successful in achieving high investor participation without the use of collective 
action clauses.  With over $520 billion in emerging market bonds, and about $400 billion 
in public and publicly guaranteed bonds, the recent bond exchanges are significant as 
they might well provide a precedent for future sovereign bond exchanges of distressed 
debt. 
 
  Some complexities regarding bond defaults.  In contrast with the mechanics of the 
1980s, in which a sudden halt in financing prompted a default, the experiences in the late 
1990s left open many more dimensions on which the country had to make decisions.  
First of all, countries had to decide which instruments they would default upon and in 
turn which broad group of creditors would be affected.  The countries also had to decide 
if the default would be focused on local creditors or on foreign creditors. In some cases 
this distinction is difficult to make, but some instruments are clearly segmented in terms 
of their bearers, so that, to some extent, segmentation is at least partially feasible. While 
in general, policy-makers would prefer to go harder on foreign creditors, the reputation 
and international implications of such decision may make this alternative unfeasible.  
Thus, one thing is what policy-makers would prefer to do, and another is what they may 
be able to.
41   
 
  For example, Ecuador and Argentina (2002) chose to default on all debt 
instruments.  By contrast, Russia, Ukraine and Pakistan chose a limited default that 
covered just a few type of instruments.  When Ecuador decided initially to exclude 
Eurobonds from its default, it met criticism from the international financial community, 
which requested a sort of pari-passu clause among bondholders that obliged the 
Ecuadorian government to backtrack this decision and include Eurobonds in the 
restructuring deal.  However, it did manage to limit the discount on PDI bonds, which 
were mostly held by local bondholders.  Likewise, (isn’t “on the other hand” more 
appropriate?)Russia initially defaulted mostly on local bondholders (holder of GKOs and 
                                                 
41 Similarly, a decision has to be made regarding debts with IFIs and bilateral lending. Here there 
appears to be a clear pattern. IFIs lending is seen as senior to everything else, with only few cases 
of default with multilaterals.  This seniority may be a way of buying the seal of approval that only 
IFIs can provide to a country, as well as the direct link that multilaterals open with the countries 
that own these organizations. In many cases, it is the private creditors themselves that want the 
country to agree with the multilaterals first, as they consider that their job is to go through a “due 
diligence” process with the country, which they cannot do themselves. Thus, the seniority of IFIs 
lending is a market accepted and encouraged outcome. On the other hand, bilateral lending and 
concessional official lending is usually considered junior to other lending. For example, Pakistan 
built substantial arrears with the Paris Club, while never entering in default with private 
bondholders. Ecuador was in arrears with the Paris Club and still was able to issue a Eurobond in 
1997.   
   28
OFZs).
42  Argentina, implemented a local-exchange in November 2001 in anticipation of 
a harsher restructuring of external debt.
43  
 
  Similarly, governments had to decide whether to do the default in several 
successive steps or as a one shot move.  The initial defaults (Russia and Ukraine) were of 
the stepwise nature, with the country denying default to the last minute, only to restrict 
the default to specific instruments and those strictly necessary.  The most recent two, 
Ecuador and Argentina, were broader and simultaneous.  How the default is implemented 
may not be independent of the motives of default.  A country facing a liquidity or 
credibility problem may choose to default selectively, to obtain the necessary relief to go 
through a particularly difficult moment in terms of financing needs.  Countries with a 




IV.  Lessons for the future 
 
  Does the debt default experience of the 1990s have applicability in a forward-
looking sense?  The basic issue is whether there is a case for a formal international 
mechanism for debt workouts or are markets addressing these issues adequately.    The 
current approach to resolving debt crisis is informal and has a precedent in recent bond 
operations.  While it represents a market-based approach, it is clearly one of muddling 
through.  Better debt workout mechanisms might be possible, namely mechanisms that 
would correct for perceived collective action failures on the creditor side.  These include  
market-based approaches like the inclusion of collective action clauses in bond contracts 
and more comprehensive approaches like the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM). 
 
The SDRM is part of the IMF’s effort to improve crisis management and the 
international financial architecture.
44   The SDRM addresses the problems of creditor 
coordination in debt workouts by proposing a statutory approach that borrows some of 
the principles of U.S. domestic corporate bankruptcy and collective action clauses.
45  The 
key elements of the international bankruptcy procedure are:  provision allowing an 
insolvent country to activate the SDRM on request; aggregation of all external debt owed 
to private creditors;  provision allowing a supermajority of creditors to negotiate a debt 
restructuring that would be binding for all creditors;  sharing of proceeds from litigation;  
and provision permitting disputes to be adjudicated by independent bankruptcy tribunals.  
                                                 
42 However, there were sizable holdings of these instruments by non-residents. 
43 The option of restructuring local personal funds debt, where local bondholders could have been 
completely isolated had been discarded.  
44 See Boorman (2002), Krueger (2001, 2002) and Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2001). 
45 Some similarity with corporate debt reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.   29
Thus the SDRM would make it easier for a country to reach an agreement with a super-
majority of its creditors, while avoiding a creditor holdout problem. 
 
By providing a predictable environment for restructuring, the SDRM would 
facilitate an orderly debt workout and avoid prolonged and costly debt renegotiations.  
Reducing transactions costs in this way, enhances efficiency and stability of the 
international financial system.  The SDRM has some potential disadvantages, however.  
Notably, it could contribute to the problem of moral hazard.  By lowering the costs of 
crises, debtors might be more likely to over borrow and ignore fiscal discipline.   
Implementation issues also complicate the viability of the SDRM:  the SDRM calls for 
changing IMF Articles to override some aspects of domestic law, and these changes may 
not survive legal challenges.  
 
  In moving forward on approaches to debt restructuring, there appears to be broad 
support for incremental change-type solutions as opposed to solutions that radically 
overhaul the international financial architecture.  Thus, voluntary, market-friendly 
approaches to debt restructuring - such as the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bond 
contracts – are increasingly being viewed as a step forward in improving the current debt 
restructuring process.  This, despite the concern that CACs would likely impose higher 
borrowing costs and lower overall financial flows to emerging markets.
46  Using a model 
of sovereign debt, Kletzer (2003) argues that CACs are more efficient than the commonly 
used unanimity clauses in bond contracts, because unanimity clauses can promote rent-
seeking behavior in creditors and this can give rise to inefficient outcomes for lending 
and repayment.
47  He further concludes that if all sovereign bonds have CACs, then there 
is no added benefit of establishing a formal international bankruptcy procedure (i.e. the 
SDRM).   However, renegotiation costs may invalidate the welfare equivalence of CACs 
and the SDRM-type statutory approach.  Thus, if the formation of bondholder 
renegotiation committees is costly because of a large number of different bonds issued in 
different legal jurisdictions, then the SDRM might be more efficient because it 
aggregates debt.  Also, while the CAC approach is useful in a forwarding looking sense, 
it does not effectively address the issue of default on existing bonds, most of which do 
not have CACs.   
 
Collective action clauses have begun appearing in several recent sovereign bond  
issues.  For example, this February, Mexico became the first major emerging market 
borrower to issue a bond with CACs under New York law.  The CAC would allow a 
majority of 75% of bondholders to make wide-ranging changes to the terms of the bond 
contract in the event of a restructuring.  Although these developments suggest a growing 
                                                 
46 Eichgreen and Mody (2000) find that more for creditworthy borrowers the inclusion of CACs 
lowers bond spreads in primary issues, but less creditworthy borrowers asre likely to experience 
higher spreads on bond issues. 
   
47 Kletzer obtains these results by making the assumption that the transaction costs of 
renegotiations are either zero or lower under contracts with CACs than those with unanimity 
clauses.    30
market support for the CAC approach, it is too early to tell whether the inclusion of 






Collective action clauses approach  
 
What is it   
Changing majority action clauses in debt instruments. 
 
Features 
CACs apply to individual bond issues. 
A supermajority of bond holders (usually 75%) can agree to changing payment terms of 
the bond and the new terms would be binding for all holders of the bond. 
 
Objective 




Inclusion of CACs in bond agreements could raise borrowing costs for this class of 
instruments. 
 
Existing debt not affected by this, as it would affect new issues only. 
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Sovereign Defaults on Debt to Private Creditors
   (adapted from Sovereign Defaults:  Moving Higher Again in 2003 , Standard and Poor's dated Sept 2002)
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SEYCHELLES 2000-02








FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1992-2002 1983-91
ZAMBIA 1983-94
ZIMBABWE 1975-80* 2000-02
 *Bonds initially defaulted in 1965.  Debt initially defaulted on in 1974.





Collective action clauses include three types of clauses: the sharing clause, the 
collective representation clause, and the majority clause. (should the exit consent section 
remain here?) 
 
Sharing clause.  The sharing clause states that any payments received by one 
bondholder have to be shared with other bondholders. Sharing clauses were introduced as 
part of syndicated loans restructuring deals of the 1980s, to protect banks with little 
relation with a given debtor country that feared that they could be defaulted upon if the 
debtor priorized staying current with those banks with which it had stronger commercial 
ties. In addition, sharing clauses are an important deterrent to litigation, as any proceeds 
obtained from litigation have to be shared with other bondholders.
49 There are two ways 
in which the sharing clause can be effected. The English style sharing clause in which the 
excess payment is handed to a Fiscal Agent for ratable distribution, and the American 




Majority action clauses.  While New York law does not allow for changes in the 
payment conditions without the consent of all bondholders, London Law allows changes 
in payment terms with a quorum of 75%.
51 The rules that allow the change in the terms of 
the bonds with a qualified majority are dubbed majority action clauses. In the case of 
Ukraine, the tendering of the bonds in the exchange was automatically a proxy vote to 
apply the majority action clause, thus any bondholder which remained with the original 
bond risked his terms being changed in such a way that would render the paper less 
                                                 
48 This annex draws on Sturzenegger (2002b). 
49 Buchheit (1998b) proposes a sharing clause to read as “Each Bondholder agrees that if it shall obtain 
(whether by way of payment from the Issuer or following the exercise of set-off rights, litigation or 
otherwise) any payment in respect of the Bonds held by the Bondholder that is proportionally greater than 
the payment received by any other Bondholder in respect of the Bonds held by that other Bondholder, then: 
(i) the Bondholder receiving such excess amount shall pay such excess amount to the Fiscal Agent; (ii) the 
Fiscal Agent shall treat such amount as if it were a payment received from the Issuer in respect of the 
Bonds and shall distribute it accordingly; and (iii) as between the Issuer and the Bondholder originally 
receiving the excess amount, such excess amount shall be treated as not having been paid; provided, 
however, that no Bondholder shall be required by this Section to share any amount recovered by it as a 
result of litigation against the Issuer if Bondholder holding at least ..% of the outstanding amount of the 
Bonds shall have previously consented in writing to the commencement of that litigation.” 
50 See Buchheit (1998b). 
51 Buchheit (1998a) proposes a majority action clause the writing “Modifications and amendment to the 
Fiscal Agency Agreement or the Bonds requiring Bondholder consent of the issuer and the holder of at 
least a majority of aggregate principal amount of the Bonds at the time outstanding, provided that no such 
modification, amendment or waiver of the Fiscal Agency Agreement or any Bond may, without the consent 
of holders of at least ..% of aggregate outstanding principal amount of the Bonds voting at the bondholders 
meeting convened for this purpose (i) change the stated maturity of the principal of or interest on any such 
Bond; (ii) reduce the principal of or interest on any such Bond; (iii) change the currency of payment of the 
principal of or interest on any such Bond; or (iv) reduce the above stated percentage of aggregate principal 
amounts of Bonds outstanding or reduce the quorum requirements or the percentage of voters required for 
the taking of any action.”   35
worthy in both characteristics and payment conditions. As the threshold participation 
rates assigned for the transaction were larger than those required to change the conditions 
of the bonds, bondholders had a large incentive to participate in the transaction. This type 
of clauses can be complemented with cram-down clauses.  Cram-down clauses, which 
forces an agreement reached with a majority of bondholders to be binding on holdouts. 
For example, to protect sovereign debtors from disruptive lawsuits, majority action 
clauses prevent a small number of creditors from blocking an attempt to renegotiate the 
terms of the bonds. This clause may restrict litigation only to be feasible if a majority of 
bondholders vote in favor of pursuing litigation. 
 
Exit consents.  In some cases, the debt renegotiation cannot appeal to the majority 
clause, for example, if referring to payment terms for bonds issued under New York law. 
A way around this is known as exit consents that consist of changing the conditions of 
other characteristics of the bond, in particular, non-payment conditions, which can be 
changed by a qualified majority even under New York law. This methodology was used 
in the Ecuador restructuring. As bondholders exited the original instruments they voted 
for changes in other conditions on the original Brady bonds. Among these they removed 
provisions that would have interfered with Ecuador’s ability to close the exchange offer 
at a time when the country was in payment default, they removed the so called exit 
covenants by which Ecuador had promised never to seek a further restructuring of the 
Brady bonds, they deleted the cross default clauses, the requirement that all payment 
defaults may be cured as a condition to any rescission of acceleration, the negative pledge 
covenant, and the covenant to maintain the listing of the defaulted instruments on the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange. Argentina attempted the same methodology by keeping 
property on 50 billion of bonds swapped in the November 2001 exchange, thus gaining 
leverage for their negotiations with foreign bondholders.
52  
 
Collective Representation Clauses.  Once a country decides to default it needs to 
establish a counterpart. The experience in recent debt restructurings has been varied. 
Pakistan established direct contact with major bondholders in order to gauge possible 
acceptable settlements. Russia negotiated with the London Club. Ecuador on the other 
hand, called for a creditors committee as a consulting group (this turned ineffectual, as 
creditors chose to present their demands in a private manner). Legally, the question is 
whether a debt renegotiation counterpart can be established in the legal framework. One 
possible candidate to take up such role is the Fiscal Agents under which the bonds were 
originally issued. This would probably meet with strong resistance both from those Fiscal 
Agents, which would find themselves involved in a problem between third parties, and by 
bondholders that could have doubts as to whether the Fiscal Agent would necessarily 
defend their interests in such renegotiation. Lead managers of the outstanding bonds 
would be another candidate. But they will probably be equally ill inclined to participate 
from reluctance to accept any co-responsibility in the default. Finally, a third option is a 
group of bondholders. As long as this group is not enshrined in the covenants of the 
Bond, there is no formal obligation to do the negotiations through such group. However, 
even in those cases, these groups have remained an informal and valid counterpart. Their 
                                                 
52 See Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Lipworth and Nystedt (2001).   36
non binding recommendations, are usually useful to individual bondholders to decide 
whether to follow suit or not.
53  
                                                 
53 See Buchheit (1998c).   37
Annex 3 
Ecuador Bond Restructuring of 2000 
 
 
In August 2000, Ecuador completed a bond exchange operation involving 
defaulted Brady bonds and eurobonds.  $5.9 billion of defaulted Brady bonds and $465 
million of eurobonds were swapped for two global bonds with a face value of $3.9 
billion.  The global bonds comprised a $2.7 billion, 30-year multi-coupon bond and a 
$1.25 billion, 12-year fixed rate bond.  All bondholders were first offered the 30-year 
bond, which could (simultaneously) be exchanged for the 12-year bond at an additional 
35% discount on the principal of the 30-year bond.  Ecuador’s bond offer resulted in a 
41% reduction in principal for bondholders.  (this 41% includes the cash payment?) 
 
Investor participation in the deal was about 97%, well over the over 85% 
acceptance level.  One factor that encouraged participation was the government’s offer to 
pay bondholders $140 million of past-due principal and interest on defaulted bonds.  Exit 
amendments to cross default and negative pledge clauses in the old bonds, by investors 
who were tendering their old bonds for new bonds, and an amendment to de-list the 
bonds, pushed up the investor participation rate as well.  The government’s pledge to 
repurchase at least 3% of the 30-years bonds, starting in 2013 and at least 10% of the 12-
year bonds beginning in 2006, was also a factor. 
 
Ecuador’s bond restructuring (from default to bond exchange) was completed in 
about one year:  a relatively short time period compared to the loan restructuring episodes 
of the 1980s.  Although Ecuador’s bond exchange offer involved a haircut for creditors, 
the country did not engage in formal negotiation with its bondholders.  A Consultative 
Group comprising large institutional investors was set up, but the function of this group 
was to provide a medium for communication between the government and the creditor 
community and not to negotiate the terms of the offer.   38
 
Ecuador:  Bond Exchange of 2000
Agreement Date 2000 August
Debt eligible (a)$5.9 billions in defaulted Brady bonds
      $1.6 billion of PAR Bonds
      $1.4 billion of discount bonds
      $2.2 billion of PDIs
      $181 million of IEs 
(b) $465 million in 12- and 30-year eurobonds
       $322 million of 11.25 % fixed-rate eurobond
       $143 million of floating-rate eurobond
Discount rate 41%
Amounts exchanged  $6.7 billion
New Bond issued $3.95 billion
     30-year multicoupon bond - first phase All investors were offered the 30-year bonds, which can be 
exchanged for the 12-year bonds for an additional 35% discount 
Terms  bullet payment in 2030
interest rates Initial coupon rate of 4% until August 2001, reset annually at 
5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, thereafter 10 %. 
    12-year bond - second phase
Terms  bullet payment in 2012
interest rates 12% fixed interest rate
With the released collateral, the government offered to 
pay bondholders 140 million of past-due principal and 
interest in defaulted debt .
The government pledged to repurchase at least 3% of the 
30-year bond , starting in 2013 and at least 10% of the 12-
year bond beginning in 2006
PDIs: Past-due interest bond
IEs: Interest equalization bond  39
Annex 3 contd. 
Argentine Government Bond Exchange of June 2001 
 
Between June 1-4, 2001 Argentina conducted a “mega” bond exchange operation 
to extend bond maturities.  The government received exchange offers worth $33.3 billion 
from bondholders, and swapped existing bonds with an original value of $29.5 billion for 
$31.04 billion of new instruments.  The bond exchange was voluntary and was the 
biggest exchange of its kind. 
 
Under the bond exchange, existing bonds, including Bradys, Eurobonds and local 
securities, were exchanged for 5 types of new instruments.  Three of the new bonds have 
an interest capitalization feature (up to five years of interest capitalization), and the other 
two bonds have step-up coupon rates.  The five new bonds are: 
 
A $11.5 billion, 7-year global bond with a 7% coupon for the first three years and 
15.5% from the fourth year till maturity.  Amortization is in six semi-annual equal 
payments from June 2006 till December 2008. 
 
A $0.9 billion, 7-year global bond with a 10% coupon for the first three years and 
12.4% from the fourth year till maturity.  Amortization is the form of a bullet 
payment in December 2008. 
 
A $7.5 billion, 17-year global with a 12.25% coupon and interest capitalization of 
5 years.  Amortization is in five semi-annual equal payments from June 2016 to 
June 2018. 
 
A $8.5 billion, 30-year global with a 12% coupon and interest capitalization of 
five years.  Amortization is in the form of a bullet payment in June 2031. 
 
A $2.1 billion, 5-year local bond at floating interest rates and interest 
capitalization of two years. 
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New Bonds Pagare 2006 Global $/US$ 2008 Global 2008 Global 2018 Global 2031
Total 
Exchange
Nominal value of new issues 2,060 931 11,716 7,812 8,521 31,040
Maturity Date Jun-06 Sep-08 Dec-08 Jun-18 Jun-31
Coupon BALDAR (local) +150 bp
10% from first to third 
year, 12% from fourth 
year to maturity
7% from first to third 
year, 15.5% from 
fourth year to 
maturity 12.25% 12%
Interest Capitalization 2 years No No 5years 5 years
Amortization
6 equal semi-annual 
payments Bullet
6 equal semi-annual 
payments
5 equal semi-annual 
payments Bullet
Average Maturity 3.75 7.25 6.3 16 30
Schedule of Payments 12/19/03     16.66% 9/19/2008 6/19/06     16.66% 6/19/16      20% 6/19/2031
6/19/204     16.66% 12/19/06   16.66% 12/19/16    20%
12/19/04     16.66% 6/19/07     16.66% 6/19/17      20%
6/19/05       16.66% 12/19/07   16.66% 12/19/17    20%
12/19/05     16.66% 6/19/08     16.66% 6/19/18      20%
6/19/06       16.7% 12/19/08   16.7%
Issue Price 100% 78% 79% 73% 71%
Old Nominal Value 2,028 1,215 11,093 7,123 8,034 29,493
Old Market  Price 2,030 729 8,999 5,467 6,024 23,249
Clearing price 100% 60% 81% 77% 75%
Source:  Adapted from Ministry of Economy website
Argentina: Description of Mega Bond Exchange - June 2001  41
  
Annex 3 contd. 
Ukraine Bond Exchange of 2000 
 
On February 4, 2000, Ukraine presented a voluntary offer to exchange its 
eurobonds for new bonds.  The exchange involved four eurobonds and all Gazprom 
bonds.  The eurobonds comprised a 500 million pound sterling, 14.75% eurobond due 
March 2000,  a $258 million zero-coupon eurobond due September 2000,  a $75 million, 
16.75% eurobond due October 2000, and a DM 1.5 billion, 16% eurobond due February 
2001.  $280 million of Gazprom bonds falling due in 2000-01 were included in the 
exchange, and later on $735 million of Gazprom bonds maturing between 2002-06 were 
also added to the offer.   
 
Of the $2.7 billion of debt eligible under the offer, $2.3 billion was exchanged for 
two new bonds:  a $1.13 billion, 7-year eurobond with an 11% coupon and a 1.13 billion 
euro-denominated, 7-year eurobond with a 10% coupon.  The investor participation rate 
exceeded the minimum 85% participation acceptance level that had been set for 
eurobonds and bonds falling due in 2000-01.  This is noteworthy, because 40% – 50% of 
the investor base was comprised of retail investors.  A sweetener to investors in the form 
of a $220 million pay-out of accrued interest helped boost investor participation.  The use 
of collective action clauses in three of the bonds (the DM 1.5 billion bond did not have 
CACs) may also have exerted a favorable affect on participation. 
 
                   Ukraine:  Bond Exchange of 2000
Agreement Date 2000 February
Debt eligible About $2.7 billion
(a) 500 million  Sterling Pounds Eurobond due in 2000/03
(b) $258 million Zero coupon paper due in 2000/09
(c) DM 1.5 billion eurobond due in 2001/02
(d) $ 75 million eurobond due in 2000/10 
(e) $ 280 million of Gazprom bonds due in 2000 and 2001
(f)  $ 735 million of Gazprom bonds due in 2002-2006
Discount no debt forgiveness
Amounts exchanged  $ 2.3 billion
New Bond issued
7-year Eurobond  either
   (a) denominated in Euros
Terms  semi-annual amortization payments with six-month grace period (schedule)
Amounts 1.13 billion Euro
interest rates 10%
   (a) denominated in US$




2000/02 agreement not to be confused with 
     (a) 1998/09 $ 590 million exchange of short-term domestic T-bills held by non-resident for dollar-denominated 2-years eurobond,
     (b) 1999/07 $163 million Eurobond swap to 3-year D-Mark-denominated eurobond (80%) and 20% cash payment  42
 
Annex 3 contd. 
Pakistan Eurobond Exchange of 1999 
 
The January 1999 agreement with Paris Club creditors required Pakistan to obtain 
comparable treatment of its debt due to all its external public or private creditors, 
including to bondholders.  This meant that the government had to seek from its 
bondholders a reorganization of its bonds on terms comparable to those on bilateral debt. 
 
On November 15, Pakistan launched a “voluntary” bond exchange involving three 
dollar-denominated eurobonds with a  face value of $610 million.  The three bonds were:  
a $150 million, 11.5% eurobond due in December 1999;  a $300 million floating rate note 
due in May 2000;  and a $160 million, 6% convertible bond due in February 2002 and 
with a put in February 2000.  Under the bond operation, the three eurobonds were 
swapped for a six-year, $623 million eurobond with a 10 percent coupon.  
 
The bond operation was viewed as a success because of the very high investor 
participation rate – near 99%.  A relatively narrow investor base – a limited number of 
mostly institutional investors - and the possibility of a default on the original bonds are 
believed to have contributed to the high participation rate.  Investor participation was also 
boosted by the terms on the new bond, which provided a sweetener relative to the 
prevailing market price.  The size and structure of the new bond implied that this 
instrument would be more liquid than the original bonds, thereby, adding to the 
attractiveness of the offer.  Because of these and other factors, majority or collective 
action clauses in the old bonds did not need to be invoked to achieve high investor 
participation. 
 
Pakistan Bond Exchange of 1999
Agreement Date 1999 November
Debt eligible (a) $150 million, 11.5 % eurobond due in December 1999
(b) $300 million floating rate note due in May 2000
(c) $160 million, 6% convertible due in February 2002
Discount no debt forgiveness
Amounts exchanged  $610 million
New bonds
Eurobond 2005
Terms  matures 2005
Amounts $623 million




East Asia crisis and debt workouts 
 
            In the wake of the East Asia crisis of 1997, domestic financial institutions in 
Korea and Indonesia faced severe payment difficulties on their external debts.  These 
were forced to reschedule their debt obligations with the help of government guarantees.        
 
The Korean rescheduling - In March 1998, the Korean government signed an 
agreement with foreign creditor banks on rescheduling short-term foreign debt of 
domestic financial institutions.  The agreement scheduled $24 billion of short-term 
foreign debt into long-term debt: loans with one to three years maturity and interest rate 
spreads over Libor of 225 bp for one-year loans, 250 bp for two-year loans, and 275 bp 
for three-year loans.  $20 billion of the new debt carried government guarantees. 
 
In June 1998 (Frankfurt Agreement), Indonesia reached an agreement with a 
group of 13 foreign creditor banks on a framework for rescheduling private sector debt 
($80 billion).  The categories of debt covered were interbank debt, trade finance and 
corporate debt.  Indonesian commercial banks’ were able to exchange their foreign 
currency obligations to foreign banks for new loans with government guarantees.  The 
new loans ranged in maturity from one to four years, and were at interest rate spreads of 
275 bp, 300 bp, 325 bp and 350 bp over Libor.  About $7 billion of the $9.2 billion of 
short-term interbank debt was rescheduled.  The framework for corporate debt 
restructuring allowed Indonesian companies to reschedule their loans with a three-year 
grace period and an eight-year maturity and a real interest rate of 5.5 percent.  The 
creation of the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) was to provide foreign 
exchange cover for Indonesian corporations with foreign currency debt, once they have 
reached debt rescheduling agreements 
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Annex 5 




Argentina 2001/06: a total of $29.5 billion of outstanding bonds, including 
partial Brady bonds and domestic debt, were exchanged for five new bonds for a 
total nominal value of $30.4 billion  with  the purpose of improving the 
amortization profile in the coming five years. Three of the exchange bonds 
include up to five years interest capitalization and the other two bonds have a 
step up coupon rates. The $11.5 billion, 7-year global bond starts at a coupon 
rate of 7% for the first three years and 15.5% from  the fourth year till maturity 
date.. The amortization period covers six semi-annual equal payments from June 
2006 till Dec. 2008. The second global bond , $0.9 billion with a step up 
coupon rate, begins at 10% for the first three years and goes up to 12.4% , from 
the fourth year till maturity on Sept. 2008.  The amortization is done in a bullet 
payment. Two of the three bonds with interest capitalization, have a coupon rate 
around 12%. These bonds include a $7.5 billion, 17-year global and a $8.5 
billion, 30- year global  with a five- year  interest capitalization in each case.The 
amortization period for the 17-year global and the 30-year global is five  semi-annual equal payments from June 2016 to June  2018  and a bullet payment , respectively. The $2.1 billion, 5-year local bond  has an interest capitalization of two years and is
Russia - 2000/08: Prins and Ians were exchanged: $22.2 billion in 
Prins – bonds issued in exchange for old 1997 London Club debt; and 
$6.8 billion in Ians – bonds issued in exchange for interest arrears on 
1997 London Club debt.  Also, $2.8 billion in past-due-interest was 
restructured.  The new instruments were $2.8 billion in 10-year bonds 
and $18.2 billion in 30-year bonds.  The country was in default on 
these bonds, and creditors took a 37.5 % reduction in Prins and a 33% 
reduction in principal of Ians.  The obligor of the new bonds was the 
Russian Federation, as opposed to Vnesheconombank.
Ukraine- 2000/02:A voluntary offer to exchange  eurobonds for new bonds.  Of 
the $2.7 billion of debt eligible under the offer, $2.3 billion was exchanged for 
two new bonds:  a $1.13 billion, 7-year eurobond with an 11% coupon and a 
1.13 billion euro-denominated, 7-year eurobond with a 10% coupon.  The 
investor participation rate exceeded the minimum 85%   A sweetener to 
investors in the form of a $220 million pay-out of accrued interest helped boost 
investor participation.  
Ecuador- 2000/08: completion of  a bond exchange operation 
involving defaulted Brady bonds and eurobonds.  $5.9 billion of 
defaulted Brady bonds and $465 million of eurobonds were swapped 
for two global bonds with a face value of $3.9 billion.  The global 
bonds comprised a $2.7 billion, 30-year multi-coupon bond and a 
$1.25 billion, 12-year fixed rate bond.  All bondholders were first 
offered the 30-year bond, which could (simultaneously) be exchanged 
for the 12-year bond at an additional 35% discount on the principal of 
the 30-year bond.  Ecuador’s bond offer resulted in a 41% reduction in 
principal for bondholders.  
Peru-2002/02: A voluntary offer to swap $1.2 billion worth of 20- and 30-year 
Brady bonds for $930 million in 10-year bonds in an exchange aimed at 
reducing the country's outstanding foreign debt. ($580 million worth of Past-
Due Interest Bonds (PDI) maturing 2017, $475 million of Front-Loaded Interest 
Reduction Bonds (FLIRB) due 2017, $110 million of fixed rated bonds (PAR) 
due 2027 and $45 million of Floating Rate Bonds due 2027
Private
Indonesia-1998/06:Agreement on a framework for rescheduling $80 
billion of private foreign debt (private corporate debt, interbank debt, and 
trade finance).Indonesian commercial banks with foreign currency 
obligations to foreign banks were exchanged for new government 
guaranteed loans with maturities of one to four years, at interest rates of 
2.75, 3, 3.25,and 3.5 % over LiBOR. About $7 billion of the 9.2 billion of 
Short-term interbank debt were rescheduled in accordance with the term 
of the agreement.
Korea-1998/01:Agreement to restructure short-term foreign debt owed 
to foreign commercial banks. Eligible short-term debt of $24 billion was 
converted to new Government-guaranteed loans with maturities between 
one and three years with floating interest rates set between 2.25 and 
2.75 percentage points over LIBOR.  45
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